Introduction
Hurricane Katrina was a category five Atlantic cyclone that resulted in over 1,200 deaths and approximately 100 billion in damage. The Hurricane happened in August 2005 and affected New Orleans and the surrounding areas. New Orleans was heavily affected because it is situated below sea level and protected by Levees, which protects it from Lake Ponchartrain and the Mississippi river (Andersen et al., 2007). The levee failed to contain the strength of the Hurricane, and water flooded the city, leading to one of the most disastrous effects in US history (Hurricane Katrina, 2006). Although there was an evacuation order, most of the low-income individuals remained within the city. The individuals who sought shelter at the Superdome Stadium were exposed to deplorable conditions, including food shortage, water and sanitation, and rampant insecurity. This paper will critique the response process using the key elements; resources from state and federal agencies, first responders, secondary emergency services, and private sector resources and offer recommendations.
Responses
Although the general population's evacuation was relatively high in three states, it was a slow process, and the most vulnerable were left behind (Hurricane Katrina, 2006). The slow evacuation was blamed on Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin, who, despite having a sufficient warning; 56 hours before the disaster, delayed the evacuation by 37 hours in New Orleans, leading to an incomplete evacuation (Hurricane Katrina, 2006). Additionally, the lack of a pre-disaster plan, from the Federal and State government, led to the delayed response, insufficient resources allocation leading to a failed support.
Resources from State and Federal Agencies
Logistics Issues
Despite massive resources from both government levels, most of the people still regard the efforts insufficient. This is due to the lack of proper planning and operational structure for the delivery of essential resources and humanitarian assistance. First, a highly bureaucratic supply process from the Federal government was highly inflexible and inefficient, thus failing to leverage the private sector and accommodate the contemporary supply chain management. Secondly, the Federal resource management was unable to determine which resources were required, the available resources, and the resources' location (Sobel & Leeson, 2006). In the rare cases where the teams knew what was needed, they could not determine whether the National government had the resources or any available alternatives. Another failure was the lack of an effective mechanism to integrate and deploy resources leading to a crisis even when the local agencies approached the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with a list of requirements (Sobel & Leeson, 2006). It can then be argued that it is not the resources' inadequacy, but FEMA's lack of a proper plan or alternatives, and lack of a resource-tracking system that left the government unaware of the status of the resources once they were delivered.
Public Health and Medical Resources
The Hurricane created massive public health crises, especially in Mississippi and Louisiana states, but the subsequent flooding in New Orleans imposed disastrous health conditions leading to unprecedented mobilization of federal public health and medical resources. However, over 200,000 individuals suffering from chronic conditions lacked critical medication as they were displaced by the flood (Sobel & Leeson, 2006). Most state hospitals had been destroyed, with the remaining institutions and deployed personnel being overwhelmed by the existing conditions. They could not locate, triage, and treat the injured or the acutely sick (Lessons Learned, 2006). There were also challenges such as managing chronic medical conditions, and the provision of assistance from state and local health facilities rendering the whole process futile.
Solutions
The Federal government should update the logistic system to match that of the 21st century: fully transparent and four tied systems. Such as system will ensure that all the essential organs are aware of the status of supplies, alternative and where each is required eliminating any foreseeable confusion. In case of a technical failure, the government should have an alternative such as the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). The processes of authorizing issues such as reimbursements for the medics should be eased to avoid delays and frustrations among the practioners, patients, and the public. Transparent systems should be put in place to ensure that all the resources allocated are appropriately utilized, to avoid resource strain amid resource abundance. Proper structures should be put in place to avoid fragmented command structure and clear communication. Lastly, both the Federal government and state government should have an electronic health record of the patients with any condition at all times.
First Responders
The Military
As the first responders, the military helped save many lives and substantially assisted the recovery efforts. However, despite having a prior disaster plan and training, the military failed to incorporate the lessons learned from previous catastrophes that would have given the military the upper hand. This means that their National Response Plan exercise failed to distinguish between less magnitude disasters and catastrophic natural disasters. Thus, the plan failed to account for the situations where the military might offer full range assistance, allocate tasks between the military, Federal and State responders, or establish any timeframe. The military lacked timely damage assessment, communication challenges, ballooning issues from the catastrophe, uncoordinated search and rescue, and, problematic logistical responsibilities.
Other Organs
Other responders such as Coast Guard, FEMA Urban Search and Rescue Task Force (US&R), together with local emergency responders, were put at unnecessary risk by an existing structure that failed to support them. There lacked proper coordination between these organs resulting from the different orientation, mission, and rescue goals. This is because each responder had been trained differently, and their operations processes were also different leading to ballooning confusion (Hurricane Katrina, 2006). There lacked an integrated search and rescue structure or incident command leading to a crush in operations. The outcome was different teams being sent to one area while other areas were left uncovered. Again, upon recovery, there lacked any formal direction of where the rescued were to be taken.
Solution
The Federal and state government should develop a state and local organ made up of military, US&R, and Coast personnel trained and headed by one department. They should be deployed in high-risk areas and be provided with resources enough to conduct regular joint exercises. The exercises should include the locals to ensure that locals and state organs work together in the rescue mission in case of any emergencies.
Secondary Emergency Services
Foreign Assistance
Immediately after the catastrophe, the United States became a beneficiary of outpouring international support. However, the country was not prepared to make the best out of the support (Lessons Learned, 2006). In some instances, the Federal bureaucratic processes barred these international efforts. Contextually, the US could not integrate and prioritize the generous foreign donation to the ongoing response process. Thus, the resources went unused, resulting in the frustration of the donor countries. The US also failed to provide the international governments up-to-date records of their affected nationals.
Solution
Federal departments and state departments must review the policies, plans, and procedures for these secondary actors and international foreign emergency assistance management. They should clarify the responsibilities and processes of handling and obtaining information about foreign nationals in high-risk and national areas.
Private Sector Resources
Most of these were from faith-based organizations, private agencies, and charitable organizations. All the national, regional, local, and substantial foreign charitable organizations contributed significantly to aid the recovery mission. All their services were adequately planned and executed, with their resources such as mobile kitchens, shelter, and counseling being offered effectively. However, the government agencies failed to coordinate appropriately with them presenting obstacles and failed government support (Hurricane Katrina, 2006). The government could not match their planning, aid, and logistics, such that, even in rare instances where the government matched private sector aid, there were issues in logistics and communication.
Solution
The private sector and charitable organizations play a critical role in recovery and emergency preparedness. The government should have its institutions integrated with those of the private sector and conduct joint preparedness exercises to strengthen the national preparedness.
Conclusion
Response to any disaster requires thorough preparedness, coordination of the Federal organs, State agencies, Private Sector and Charitable organization, and the international actors. Before any disaster, these organs should be involved in joint response planning processes to ensure a structured, organized, and effective resource allocation, command, and recovery strategy. A review of Hurricane Katrina's response plan exposes levels of government and state agencies that were unprepared despite early warnings.
References
Andersen, C., Asce, M., Battjes, J., David, E., Daniel, P., Edge, B., Asce, F., Espey, W., Wre, D., Gilbert, R., Jackson, T., Kennedy, D., Mileti, D., James, K., Mitchell, P., Asce, H., Nicholson, P., Pugh, C., Tamaro, G., … Roth, L. (2007). THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong and Why A Report by the American Society of Civil Engineers Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel. Retrieved March 24, 2019, from https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/katrina/reports/ERPreport.pdf
Sobel, R. S., & Leeson, P. T. (2006). Government’s response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice analysis. Public Choice, 127(1–2), 55–73. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-7730-3
United States. Congress. House. Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for, & Response to Hurricane Katrina. [Hurricane Katrina] (2006). A failure of initiative: Final report of the select bipartisan committee to investigate the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina (Vol. 109, No. 377). US Government Printing Office. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-109hrpt377/pdf/CRPT-109hrpt377.pdf
United States. Executive Office of the President, Etats-Unis. Assistant to the president for homeland security, counterterrorism, superintendent of documents, president of the united states staff, united states. Assistant to the president for homeland security, ... & superintendent of documents staff. [Lesson Learned]. (2006). The federal response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons learned. Government Printing Office.
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