Paper Example on Grue Paradox and the Ravens Paradox

Introduction

Many type of reasoning both in science and in everyday life involves the adjustments of our world view based on the evidences. In most case, it is a matter of adjusting our perceptions regarding the genera claims on the based on the evidences regarding specific things. For instance, it is possible for one to adjust his views regarding a question of how good a Liverpool Football Club is based on the evidences. This could be explained in the view of the first match they came against a powerful team such as Arsenal. In science, we adjust our perceptions or view about some theory's acceptability on the grounds of the results particular experimental findings. In order for this to be sensible, it must the case that a particular data piece may count in favor of the theory and sometimes count against it. As we will use the terms, some evidences confirms a theory while other disconfirm the theory in any case it counts against it. In this way, it is worth to note that the evidences can count in the favour of a theory without necessarily banking on whether or not a theory is true. The attempt to provide an answer in this case is known as the confirmation theory. In this paper, therefore, I will discuss the paradoxes that originates within the confirmation theory. In other words, they are paradoxes which conflict with instinctively quite plausible principles about rational choice. The paradoxes we will discuss today are cases which conflict with instinctively quite reasonable principles regarding when the evidence counts to favour a theory. These paradoxes are called Ravens Paradox and Grue Paradox.

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Grue Paradox and the Ravens Paradox

The Raven paradox is a paradox that originates from the question of the things that constitutes to evidences for a given statement. Observation of the objects that are not black nor raven may increase the probability that all ravens are black. However, intuitively, these observations are not related. This problem arose as a proposition by the logician Hempel, who aimed at illustrating the contradiction that existed between the inductive logic, and the intuition. On the other hand, the "grue paradox" offers the imposition that universal statements cannot be confirmed by any amount of empirical evidence. The paradox shows us that elimination of the induction as a means to provide a justification that is confirmed by some body of evidence, there must be an infinite number of the alternative hypothesis that should be inconsistent with the initial one, which are all equally confirmed by the same evidence. As a result, there is no justification regarding the evidences as ever confirming a given hypothesis more than the other.

Solutions to Raven Paradox and Grue Paradox

In this paper, I argue that the Bayesian accounts of confirmation can be used to solve the raven paradox, with the appeal to confirmation. The revitalization of confirmation to the background knowledge brings this solution to a proof. The proof itself I this case will be critical in the solution of the ravel. Having a critical consideration and analysis of issues which eliminates the stimuli generalization in the perception of the various happens both in the scientific area and in the typical life experience. The discrimination of the stimuli that calls for every situation and happening being treated as a single case gives more reliable information about a thing and hence it stands to solves the ravel paradox. However, it is also important to note that the degree of confirmation cannot be essential in providing the proof for the grue paradox. Ideally, confirmation refers to a relationship that exists between the evidence and a hypothesis and which mirrors the support which an evidence provides a hypothesis. For example, one may say that a positive pregnancy test provides a confirmation that an individual is pregnant. It therefore refers that having a better understanding of the confirmation relation is crucial in order to understand the association between the evidences and hypothesis within a scientific practice. The Raven's paradox is therefore a simple matter of classification.

In nature, real ravens do not exists in nature other than the things that we can classify through assigning names to them. This ravel is used symbolically to stand for the experiences of the individuals and the linkage between the people and their environment. The analysis of the same is meant to reveal the matters of life and development in different sectors in the society and hence it is important to be evaluated with criticality. Ideally, the problem is that ravens can only be called ravens if the definition follows a specific pattern of consistency with classification of raven. In this case, the definition and classification are equivalent properties. However, a major problem is that a standard definition of what falls or does not fall under ravens. The understanding of the ravel is generally not universal to all individuals rather it is interpreted according to the philosophy of the school of thought an individual or body decides on. This is because the meaning of the words are both subjective and relative. They are not rooted in any objective basis as well as the change over a given time. If all the Ravens are black, all non-black things must therefore be non-ravens, right? The answer is Yes, but no. By this, I mean that time is change and because things change, one is able to get a pink raven or perhaps something that resembles a raven but which is not because it is not black but pink. It has been further argued that Pravens and ravens have certain identity. Others have also argued that Pravens are not ravens. Who is right in this case? In my opinion, no one is right because of the lack of the objective standard of a true definition of raven. It is upon us to demonstrate willingness to decide about ourselves in one way or another, but neither is objectively correct.

In regard to the grue paradox, I believe that this paradox can be solved through considering the enumerative induction as well as the background conditions. Noteworthy is the fact that it is not easy to find something wrong with the grue, which generates intuitively plausible results regarding the inductive arguments are good arguments, and which are rooted. Sainsbury offers a favor, to reject the principle which was crucial in the generation of the paradox, that every example of generalization confirms that kind of generalization. In reality, this solves the problem of grue paradox. However, by itself, it does not sufficient. This is because the reasoning characteristics of science can at time provides us with the reason fir belief. It enables us to assert the kind of inductive reasoning that perform this in any case the enumerate inductions fails. This is the exact point that Goodman's was attempting to arrive at through his paradox. As such, we can come up with a particular principle that can be put as follows: A generalization that all A's are B's is confirmed through the instances unless we have good reason to believe that certain properties, O, exist. In this case, every A is O, and this means that if these A-instances had not been O, then they wouldn't be B. Ideally, this principle provides a tremendous confirmation partly a matter of what background beliefs one brings to attach to the circumstances.

Conclusion

In conclusion, evidences can count in the favour of a theory without necessarily banking on whether or not a theory is true. As such, the attempt to provide an answer in this case is known as the confirmation theory. The raven is therefore a simply due to a logical representation treated both the ontological and ontological concepts the same. Through a traditional first order logic representation and associating all types with the variables of all predicates contributes to the proper logical representation. As such, neither a paradox nor ravens arises. In regard to the raven, it becomes evident that the grue paradox can be solved through considering the enumerative induction as well as the background conditions. Finding something easy wrong with the grue is not easy and this will always generate intuitively plausible results regarding the inductive arguments are good arguments, and which are rooted on nothing.