Essay Sample on Addressing the Threat of Nuclear Proliferation

Nuclear weapons are one of the biggest threats to humanity today (Wan & Solingen, 2017). A nuclear war could lead to the destruction of the majority of life on earth. There are several instances in history where different countries threatened to start a nuclear war. For example, in 1962, the Cuban missile crisis led to threats of nuclear war (Saradzhyan & Saradzhyan, 2017). More recently, the frosty relations between the United States and Iran were also seen as a probable trigger for a nuclear war between the two countries (Ward, 2020). As such, since the rise of the nuclear age in the 1930s, leaders, and organizations across the world have been trying to address the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries. Unfortunately, more countries have obtained nuclear weapons over the years. The policies and tools that have been used have also not succeeded in preventing nuclear proliferation. Therefore, there is a need to find alternative solutions to the threat.

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Nonproliferation Tools and Policies

In an attempt to address the proliferation of nuclear weapons, various nonproliferation tools and policies have been used. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was formed in 1957 to ensure that nuclear technology is used peacefully around the world (Findlay, 2016). The agency was given more powers in 1997 through the Model Additional Protocol (Rockwood, 2018). Under the new guidelines, the agency can gain more access to nuclear sites and information.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) stands out as one of the significant policies made to address nuclear proliferation. The objectives of the treaty were to prevent additional countries from getting a nuclear arsenal, promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy around the world, and champion nuclear disarmament among countries that already have a nuclear arsenal. The need for a nonproliferation policy was felt during World War II after the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Following the devastating effects of the event, the United Nations General Assembly started pursuing paths that would lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons in 1946 (Cotta-Ramusino, 2018).

Deliberations on the issue went on for more than two decades, and in these additional countries developed nuclear weapons. They include the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, France, and China. The Soviet Union and the United States finally submitted a draft of the treaty in August of 1967 following intense negotiations. At the peak of the Cold War, the two countries had the largest nuclear arsenal in the world, and hence the move was well received by the international community. The two countries would also sign the SALT I Treaty in 1972 committing to restrict their nuclear arsenals. SALT II, which proposed further restrictions, was signed seven years later (Leonard et al., 2019). The draft was revised and signed by 59 countries immediately it was opened for signature. Today, there are 190 signatories to the treaty (Cotta-Ramusino, 2018).

Though the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been open for signatures since 1996, it is not yet legally binding since most countries with nuclear weapons have neither signed nor ratified it (Fukui, 2017). CTBT was meant to ban all kinds of nuclear explosions. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed in 2015 was a major milestone in the global community's efforts to stop the development of nuclear weapons in Iran (Wolf, 2018). In 2017, 122 countries became signatories of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty. The policy seeks to ensure nuclear disarmament in two decades.

Other than the treaties, various other tools have been employed in the nonproliferation campaign. Sanctions, military force, and security guarantees are some of them (Kim & Lee, 2019). Though these tools have recorded some level of success, nuclear proliferation remains a huge threat. For example, though North Korea has been sanctioned for several years, nuclear tests have persisted.

The Success of the Tools and Policies

While the policies seek to discourage the development of nuclear weapons by different countries, the use of nuclear technology for other purposes such as medical research and energy generation is promoted. This challenge is largely responsible for the failure of nonproliferation strategies. Reviews on the success of NPT are mixed. Some experts argue that the theory helped create a standard to be followed in the pursuit of nuclear capabilities. To some extent, the treaty has helped prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Resultantly, though more countries have nuclear weapons, the number of nuclear weapons around the world has shrunk as compared to the 1980s (O'Hanlon et al., 2020). Several countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, considered starting nuclear programs but eventually decided against it. Others, such as South Africa, created nuclear stockpile but later destroyed it. Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan also transferred their nuclear weapons to Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union. These can be cited as some of the successes of the NPT.

However, critics argue that the treaty has largely failed to achieve its objectives. For instance, while only five countries had a nuclear arsenal at the time the treaty was signed, the number of has grown. Israel, India, North Korea, and Pakistan are believed to have developed nuclear weapons. Besides, the treaty does not address some critical modern-day issues, such as the possibility of terrorist groups acquiring nuclear weapons. Also, though the treaty has provisions for the safe use of nuclear energy, there are no robust laws to prevent the illegal use of nuclear technology by rogue countries. The fact that the five countries that had nuclear arsenals when the treaty was signed still maintain them, has also led to disquiet among other signatories. The treaty also suffered a major setback in 2003 when North Korea withdrew from it (Siamkhum, 2017). The country has ever since been a major cause of concern. An attempt to find a solution failed in 2009 when North Korea walked out of the Six-party Talks. Subsequent talks also failed.

Alternative Solutions

While the policies and tools used to promote nonproliferation recorded some levels of success in the 20th century, the 21st century faces a different set of technological and geopolitical challenges that are bound to hurt the nonproliferation agenda further (Muller, 2017). For instance, as the calls for a reduction in carbon emission rises, more countries might be tempted to turn to nuclear power for energy. Advancement in technology has also made it easier for countries to develop nuclear weapons. As such, there is a need for more strict measures and policies to address the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. In light of the above changes, more resources and efforts should be targeted at the detection of various proliferant behaviors. This tool is one of the most potent ways of ensuring the success of the nonproliferation regime. To enhance the detection capability, the CTBT should be strengthened, and the countries that already hold nuclear weapons should ratify the treaty to make it effective. The organization has proven its worth severally and hence when given sufficient support and powers, it can detect nuclear explosions carried out underwater and even underground anywhere in the world.

As technology advances, the regulatory bodies should also rely on information and techniques that have been thoroughly researched and proven. To this end, IAEA should invest in a research agenda to develop tools such as drones and techniques like satellite imagery, which can help detect ad interpret the earth's chemical composition (Rutkowski & Niemeyer, 2020). With the rise in the application of big data, there is an opportunity to enhance detection. For instance, the data can help identify what specific countries are selling or buying. As such, the regulatory would easily spot and investigate any illicit behavior. An international nuclear security architecture should also be established to harmonize the global best practices and standards regarding nuclear weapons and security.

Other than detection, there is a need for the adoption of policies aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Regardless of the guidelines laid down in NPT, more countries have developed nuclear weapons. Since the countries with the highest likelihood of acquiring nuclear weapons are known, strategies similar to those that have been used in Iran should be pursued. Recently, the United States has made attempts to employ the same technique in North Korea, though it has not come to fruition. The JCPOA, therefore, can be used as a model in future negotiations (Wright, 2019). However, to rectify the flaws found in the agreement, various changes should be made. First, the framework for intrusive monitoring and verification should be expanded. Secondly, such agreements should have strict restrictions on enrichment.

Finally, it is probable that despite the best efforts by the international community and the regulatory bodies to detect and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, some countries will still go ahead and acquire nuclear weapons. For instance, North Korea has been expanding its nuclear arsenal in the last 25 years despite diplomacy and pressure from the international community. In such cases, more sanctions should be imposed on the actors to get them to comply with the existing agreements and guidelines. There is also a need to approach such cases from a multilateral rather than bilateral perspective. For example, the involvement of other countries in the Korean Peninsula might lead to better outcomes in negotiations (Lovering et al., 2020).

References

Cotta-Ramusino, P. (2018). Status of Nuclear Non-proliferation. International Cooperation for Enhancing Nuclear Safety, Security, Safeguards and Non-proliferation-60 Years of IAEA and EURATOM, 101-108. Retrieved from https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-662-57366-2_16

Findlay, T. (2016, 30). IAEA Noncompliance Reporting And the Iran Case. Arms Control Today, 46(1), 30. Retrieved from Arms Control Today: http://search.proquest.com/openview/4acbc4508b87b2fe7dd018c596c9d488/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=37049

Fukui, Y. (2017). CTBT: Legal Questions Arising from Its Non-Entry into Force Revisited. Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 22(2), 183-200. Retrieved from https://academic.oup.com/jcsl/article-pdf/doi/10.1093/jcsl/krw027/19597674/krw027.pdf

Kim, I., & Lee, J. C. (2019). Sanctions for Nuclear Inhibition: Comparing Sanction Conditions between Iran and North Korea. Asian Perspective, 43(1), 95-122. Retrieved from https://muse.jhu.edu/article/716352/summary

Leonard, N., Udoudom, M. D., & Bassey, S. A. (2019). Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT): an ethical or political problem. International Journal of Humanities and Innovation (IJHI), 2(1), 28-30. Retrieved from http://www.humanistudies.com/ijhi/article/view/32

Lovering, J. R., Abdulla, A., & Morgan, G. (2020). Expert assessments of strategies to enhance global nuclear security. Energy Policy, 139, 111306. Retrieved from https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421520300653