Egyptian uprising

Published: 2019-11-08 09:30:00
1238 words
5 pages
11 min to read
letter-mark
B
letter
University/College: 
Type of paper: 
This essay has been submitted by a student. This is not an example of the work written by our professional essay writers.

President Hosni Mubaraks regime is one the quite essential case of the long-lasting authoritarian rule, and if there was ever to be an uprising against such rule, it should not have emanated from Egypt. Most of the supporters of Mubaraks ruling party and even the external leaders had a lot of confidence in his rule, our assessment is that the Egyptian government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and the interests of its people, said the secretary of state Hillary Clinton on 25th January 2011 (El-Ghobashy, 2011). With the influence that the States have over other nations in the world, Hillarys words gave weight to the common understanding of Mubaraks rule in Egypt. According to the government officials, the elites, and the foreign institutions thought that the regime was strong- not because of the force it used over the civilian propaganda rather it was because it had constructed a small umbrella of politics. Political parties and associations were allowed to do their elections but under strict control, providing just enough space to keep the people on toes without becoming a threat to the regime.

The momentous Egyptian uprisings were not majorly because the Egyptians willed to it, it was because of the sudden change of the resources balance between the ruling and the ruled. The dominance of Mubarak for 30 years was thought to be fool proof. What led to an imbalance in the regime was the four days of the unending fight, 25th to 28th of January that featured fight between the police and the protesters all over the country. The fight transformed the common, familiar protests into a revolution- a time when the strength of government coercion deteriorated (Peters, 2011). This was when the normal behavior, daily customs and organization of people changed drastically. In the years preceding the revolt, the daily organization of the Egyptian people had changed (El-Ghobashy, 2011). January, 25 2011 marked a turning point for the strong regime- the strong society opted for the street politics.' This made it simple for them to coin out the weaknesses of Mubaraks regime and organize them in a list of work to do. Mubaraks regime had missed the point, and the combined efforts of the Egyptians overthrew it.

The reality with the Egyptian uprisings was that for at least a decade, the Egyptians had been rehearsing on a collective action through the acquisition of organizational experience on the street politics. The streets in Egyptian towns and cities had become negotiating tables, parliaments and fighting grounds all rolled to one. The police had a hard time in determining which lead to take and often the local residents were to suffer the brutality (Abdelmottlep, 2011). By January 25th, every sector of protesters had street experience with the police- from the villagers in Delta province to Helwan university students.

Outdoor political clashes continued between the police and the locals on various streets throughout the year 2010 with some cases leading to mass arrests of the protesters and curfews. Though not recorded, these events of police-civilian confrontations saw the police and the civilians both drawing a similar set of devices. In some instances, police were seen beating up the civilians to death (Peters, 2011). The November-December legislative elections which saw Mubarak returning 97 percent of seats through his National Democratic Party (NDP) were fully managed by the police (Abdelmottlep, 2011). Since it was obvious that the elections were rigged, the political leaders were blatantly angered and the ordinary citizens alike; this spurned a unified protest on December 12 which still leaves a noticeable mark in dozens of streets all over the country. The planned national day of rage arrived virtually in every corner of Egypt- the famous January 25, 2011. The political atmosphere was fully electrified; the protests which had a familiar start ended up being a massive uprising against the existing autocratic rule (Maher 32).

During the uprisings, almost all the Egyptians participated in the protests with a common quest for political freedoms, better wages, and better working conditions. But what was more astonishing is the massive turn-up of the youths during the demonstrations that accelerated the uprisings, and they were also the key in sustaining the revolution (Roudi-Fahimi, et al. 2011). The Egyptian youths are the aspects behind the revolutions that occurred: they spurred large part of the revolutions by using the social media where they aired their views.

Following the January 21, 2011, revolution, changes in opportunities in political structures have occurred and have subsequently affected the dynamics between the Security Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) and its contestants and the anti-regime mobilizations. It is true that the changes in the political arena emanating from the 18 days of uprising transformed and reconfigured the power structures between the regime and its opponents. The SCAFs objective was to secure the finances, and the independence of Egypt amid the revolution and on the other hand the protesters had a primary goal of achieving the aims of revolution which included political freedom and social justice. The problem arose when each side had a conflicting strategy on how to achieve the goals. The protesters generalized that there had to be a swift way of transiting to a civilian rule and on the other hand, SCAF believed that they had to remain in power for quite some time in order to manipulate the laws in their favor. In the end, the protest side became angry and mobilized more demonstrations to delegitimize SCAF (Stein, 2012). The SCAFs response was to over them concessions for fear of illegitimacy in the eyes of the population (Roudi-Fahimi, Tsai and El Feki).

Following the expiry of the military rule, Mohamed Morsi assumed power as the president in June 2012, his rule was faced with a lot of challenges. In addition to the falling economy, the damage caused by the military declarations had robbed him of full executive powers on the other hand Egyptians had held very high expectations following the overthrow of Mubaraks regime. Additionally, Morsi made controversial political appointments and choices which raised the fury of the people. All these summed up together led to mass protests and violent clashes on November 22, 2012, between the Muslim Brotherhood supporters and the opponents (Roudi-Fahimi, Tsai and El Feki). The subsequent violence which erupted during the protests in Ittihadiya accelerated mobilizations against his power, later on leading to a coup and his removal on June 30 (Stein, 2012). Not clear yet are the events that surround this event for the fact that decision-making processes by the military during such a period are never made public. However, the available information shoe that the popular participatory coup was facilitated by the opposition co-optation. What it can be observed from this is that after the January 2011 revolution, remnants of the old Mubaraks regime remained, and they are currently capitalizing on the opportune time to regain power, being much stronger than they were under the rule of Mubarak.

Work Cited

Abdelmottlep, Mamdooh A. "The Egyptian Revolution: An Analysis Of The Egyptian Police Response, The Way To The Egyptian Police Reform (Subjective Projection)". FRCIJ 1.5 (2015): n. pag. Web.

El-Ghobashy, Mona. "The Praxis Of The Egyptian Revolution | Middle East Research And Information Project". N.p., 2011. Web. 28 Sept. 2016.

Maher, Stephen. "The Political Economy Of The Egyptian Uprising". Monthly Review 63.6 (2011): 32. Web.

Peters, Michael A. "The Egyptian Revolution 2011". Policy Futures in Education 9.2 (2011): 292. Web.

Roudi-Fahimi, Farzaneh, Tyjen Tsai, and Shereen El Feki. "Youth Revolt In Egypt, A Country At The Turning Point". N.p., 2011. Web. 28 Sept. 2016.

Stein, Ewan. "Revolution Or Coup? Egypt's Fraught Transition". Survival 54.4 (2012): 45-66. Web.

sheldon

Request Removal

If you are the original author of this essay and no longer wish to have it published on the SpeedyPaper website, please click below to request its removal: