Essay Example on the Doctrine of Physicalism

Introduction

Physicalism a commonly discussed problem in philosophy. The problem can be simply stated as a connection between the body and the mind - between the psychological domain (the domain of beliefs, contemplations, torments, emotions, sensations, etc.) and the physical domain (atoms, matter, neurons). The mind-body problem concerns the degree to which the body and the mind are discrete or something very similar (Papineau, 2013). The mind is consciousness, thought, and all about mental processes. The body, on the other hand, is about the physical parts of the brain-neurons and how it is structured. This has brought about the rise of various theories that have been forwarded to elaborate the connection between the brain, as a body part, and the mind, which is the conscious reasoning experiencing thoughts. This essay is aimed at elaborating the thesis of physicalism, differentiating two forms of physicalism, and generally relating it to various types of reductionism, thereby investigating how the thesis empowers us to gain ground with the problem of different identities.

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Physicalism

Physicalism, also known as materialism, is an extensive view about the idea of the world such that each phenomenon is physical. Accordingly, it clearly raises issues about the spot of phenomena such as consciousness, morality, and intentionality in an absolutely physical world. Physicalism views that everything known to man is made entirely out of the fundamental elements and forces proposed by present-day physics i.e. electrons, protons, gravity, electromagnetism, etc. The view that, by chance, if every one of the atoms were removed, nothing would be left (Maslin, 2001). If all mental states are physical, then the theme of these states are also physical.

Types, tokens and other minds

There is a significant contrast to be drawn between token-identity and type identity. The theory of type physicalism states that each broad kind of mental state, e.g. Pain - is indistinguishable with some type of brain state. So at any point when pain is felt it would be indistinguishable with a specific instance of a few general brain state types. The theory of token physicalism is weaker (Place, 1999). It only holds that every specific instance of pain is indistinguishable to some specific brain-state, with the same brain states maybe having a place with specific kinds. It holds that every specific event of a mental state would be indistinguishable with some specific event of a brain state, however, there may lack common identities between types of mental state and mental state.

The following argument gives reasons as to why the token physicalism theory is better when compared to the rest. The human brain has a degree of plasticity for example, in spite of the fact that speech is controlled in a specific area in the brain, somebody who has damaged it can at times recuperate their capacity to speak, with a lot of practice. Thus a specific choice to talk might be indistinguishable with an event in one area of the brain. This idea doesn't conclude that the brain events are of various parts: this will rely on what is considered as the 'type' of brain-event. In any case, there isn't a specific ground to expect that the events will all be of a similar type (Place, 1999).

Assuming that the proposition of token- physicalism is the right mind-brain identity theory, then there has been something more to be stated, about what is normal to every type of physical events. Take to account the analogy below. The thesis of clouds is in all respects a variant of token-physicalism theory. Clouds can be made up out of numerous different things other than water droplets i.e. dust, smoke, etc. However, there has to be something regular to those various types of accumulations of particles that clarifies how they are generally clouds. That is: what is common is a practical property of the particles in reference, i.e. with their weight in respect to the environment/atmosphere, and how they to give their cloud appearance by reflecting light. Thus the cloud theory is a rendition of token physicalism/ identity theory, combined with a record of the causal role and function, of the diverse physical tokens.

Reduction versus reductive explanation

Related to the mind's philosophy, this thought may be thought of involving the concept that each psychological idea or predicate is broken down as far as a predicate or physical idea (Wilson, 2009). The following is a representation of this thought; Reductionism is true if, for every single psychological predicate A, there is a physical predicate B with the end goal that a statement of the structure Y is A if Y is B' is analytically valid.

Does the mind-brain identity thesis diminish the mind to the brain? Is the human mind only the neurons activity and a group of neurons? The distinction between the reduction of properties and reductive explanation of tokens is closely connected to the difference between token and type identity. Most physicalists accept that all events, processes, and things, in the world are physical. Few type-physicalists accept that high-level properties in biology, chemistry and brain research, for instance, will align with properties in physics (Wilson, 2009). It is accepted that the exceptional sciences (biology, chemistry, psychology, etc.) are independent that is, having properties and laws that can't be lowered to those of physics.

It is, therefore, possible to be a physicalist about the mind, while accepting that irreducibility and reality of mental properties. keeping in mind that in one way the mind is only an activity of the brain (since every token mental state will be token brain state) in any case, it might be the situation that in the event that there is a need to generally comprehend the mind's operation, then there will be a need to frame our clarifications in term of mental properties.

Mind-brain identity and the problem of other minds

Could the theory of physicalism give an answer to the problem of other minds? The contention of the presence of different personalities was impeded by the distinctiveness of our own state of consciousness. Provided the identity-thesis is valid, then our encounters won't be particularly distinctive. This is because the experiences are physical states of the mind, and other individuals, experience such states. In this case, there is no issue learning that different experiences exist (Maslin, 2001). If somebody has an injury, then it is recognized that they have some conscious experience. However, would it be recognized that they know about the sensation with the particular qualitative feel which is often depicted as 'pain'?

The thought that people have similar feelings/emotions inhabiting the equivalent causal roles, even with the given reality of physicalism, is false. Since it is known that individuals vary from each other in a wide range of ways, it can't be concluded that they all will have precisely comparative brain-states involving comparative causal roles.

These would be a different circumstance if additional identities were known. If a person's pain were related to a specific type of brain state, and the same states possess an equivalent causal role, then the same will apply to another person, At that point, it would be presumed that they both feel the pain in the same conditions/circumstance.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the physicalism identity theory only gives a general knowledge that people have comparable mental state involving the same causal roles. Even though it isn't fulfilling, it shows advancement in the theory. Based on the discussions above, it is seen that the thesis is most plausible than the doctrine of interactionism, when bound to tokens of mental state, giving solutions to other mind-body problem.

References

Maslin, K. T. (2001). An introduction to the philosophy of mind. Retrieved from https://philpapers.org/rec/MASAIT/

Papineau, D. (2013). The rise of physicalism. In Proper Ambition of Science (pp. 182-216). Routledge. Retrieved from https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9780203446263/chapters/10.4324/9780203446263-14

Place, U. T. (1999). Token-versus type-identity physicalism. Anthropology and Philosophy, 3, 21-31. Retrieved from https://pingpong.ki.se/public/pp/public_courses/course13241/published/1535632766777/resourceId/19013462/content/Place%20(1999)%20Token-%20versus%20type-identity%20physicalism.pdf

Wilson, J. (2009). Non-reductive physicalism and degrees of freedom. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 61(2), 279-311. Retrieved from https://academic.oup.com/bjps/article-abstract/61/2/279/1460041