Essay Sample: Introduction to Nuclear National Security

This briefing will precisely detail the current state of nuclear security in the nation. It will give details on challenges that the country still faces with regards to attack by nuclear weapons. The report briefs areas of the year 2018. As of 2018 the month of March, nuclear warheads totaled to 4000 for both strategic and non-strategic. On top of the 4000, there were an extra, 2550 warheads that were retired. The nation has currently destroyed chemical weapons of about 906% of the total number. However, the destruction should be complete by the year 2023. The section in the National security aims at ensuring that: terrorists do not acquire nuclear weapons, it strengthens nuclear detection architect and securing nuclear materials for use by appropriate departments. These nuclear weapons pose high risks and challenges to the nation.

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Nuclear material is stolen and used to fund state proliferator. The theft is then used to support the development of weapons in other countries. In as much as we focus on maintaining a good state of security in our nation, there is a need for staying vigilant to keep the peace (Kouzes, 2005). There is a belief that state officers facilitate the theft of weapons. Also, personnel tasked to manufacture these weapons may be involved in the robbery of selling nuclear weapons to terrorists or individuals outside the nation. The nuclear materials are designed for a specific purpose, transaction or transfer of these materials in a disorderly manner poses a danger to the general public. The wrong supply of nuclear material is a supporter of terrorism in the country. The section is focused on eradicating this supply. Individuals found responsible for the supply shall be treated as terrorists and they will serve a sentence as of terrorists.

Some nuclear enterprises support most conventional missions. For instance: the dual-capable bombers which they do not fly airborne signals together with nuclear weapons. This practice was initially done in the 1960s and can be done now. Similarly, laboratories involved with national security no longer focus on the mission of nuclear weapons. These laboratories perform some functions that are not related to nuclear materials. A number of these enterprises are also focused on designing new weapons without any keen interest in the mission and purpose of a nuclear mission (Osman, 2008). Therefore, it is a challenge to assess the level at which any nuclear enterprise is funded. It is a problem to determine if the enterprise is focused or effective concerning the nuclear mission (Mayer et al., 2005). The national security section shall focus on working with nuclear enterprises whose aim is to restore safety and proper use of nuclear materials.

Currently, the section is an inch away from reaching a reliable nuclear detection architect. The part is focused on retaining non deployed warheads and ensuring that warheads are available in sufficient quantities. The warheads shall then be used when there is a failure or any negative impact of political development. The section has ensured that warheads, both strategic and non-strategic, are in surplus (Shea, 2009). The surplus quantity shall serve to cover any destruction during quality assurance, reliability replacement, and annual surveillance. However, the section shall ensure a reduction to a reasonable quantity. The security section in collaboration with the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) performs some roles.

GNDA is a global firm. The section targets illegal use and transaction of unauthorized nuclear material. The target aims at protecting against terrorism caused by nuclear and radiological materials. Similarly, this section detects the transit of nuclear materials by unauthorized personnel. This detection is done through: use of passive-active detection equipment, non-technical means, deal with suspicious behavior and by use of appropriate architecture to detect nuclear threats (Kristo & Tumey, 2013). The section focuses on various sectors; these include onshore areas. For instance: the section has established a stand-alone pilot program. This program is aimed at detection nuclear and radiological materials in recreational crafts. Apart from detection in recreational crafts, small maritime vessels could be areas of smuggling unauthorized nuclear weapons. Terrorists or underperforming design personnel could smuggle these weapons. Hence, the section aims at vulnerable areas like small maritime vessels.

The stand-alone program is used as a mechanism to detect such weapons. However, in the implementation of these tasks, the section faces some challenges. There is speculation that sustaining warheads will become a challenge in the future. The laboratories are concerned with the ability to maintain a reliable level of confidence in the existing warheads. Additionally, materials and technologies used to maintain the old warheads are exceedingly difficult to acquire. The materials that were initially used are hazardous. It is also a challenge to integrate modern security features into nuclear weapon design. The absence of nuclear testing poses a challenge to determining the impacts of changes to the nuclear material. Replacement of formerly existing warheads poses a problem to the technical use and design of the warheads. Alternatively, these warheads were dismantled but the significant risks not determined. This dismantling could lead to loss of designs and proper quality warheads.

References

Kouzes, R. T. (2005). Detecting illicit nuclear materials: the installation of radiological monitoring equipment in the United States and overseas is helping thwart nuclear terrorism. American Scientist, 93(5), 422-427.

Kristo, M. J., & Tumey, S. J. (2013). The state of nuclear forensics. Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research Section B: Beam Interactions with Materials and Atoms, 294, 656-661.

Mayer, K., Wallenius, M., & Ray, I. (2005). Nuclear forensics-a methodology providing clues on the origin of illicitly trafficked nuclear materials. Analyst, 130(4), 433-441.

Osman, T. M. (2008). The Nuclear Renaissance: A challenge for the materials community. JOM, 60(1), 10.

Shea, D. A. (2009, March). The global nuclear detection architecture: Issues for Congress. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE.